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REINVIGORATING CRIMINAL ANTITRUST?

D. DANIEL SOKOL*
ABSTRACT
Contemporary rhetoric surrounding antitrust in an age of populism has potential implications with regard to criminal antitrust
enforcement. In areas such as resale price maintenance, monopolization, and Robinson-Patman violations, antitrust criminalization remains the law on the books. Antitrust populists and traditional
antitrust thinkers who embrace a singular economic goal of antitrust
push to enforce antitrust law that is already “on the books.” A
natural extension of enforcement by the antitrust populists would be
to advocate the use of criminal sanctions, outside of collusion, for
various antitrust violations which are “on the books” but have not
been used in over a generation.
A return of criminalization for noncollusion related antitrust
abuses presents potential legal problems. Current antitrust jurisprudence and policy make a return to criminalization of various practices not merely problematic as a matter of optimal deterrence, but
also unconstitutional as a matter of law. The antitrust policy of
today bears little resemblance to that of the earlier era of criminalization for a wider variety of antitrust violations. The first issue is one
of time. It has been at least a generation since antitrust criminal
cases have been brought for noncollusion based cases. The nature of
antitrust violations is also different today. Antitrust criminal cases
of the earlier era that included criminal enforcement for noncollusive
activity were misdemeanors rather than felonies. Further, antitrust
economics has pushed antitrust case law to its current state based on
* University of Florida Research Foundation of Law and University Term Professor,
University of Florida, and Senior Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. I want to
thank the William & Mary Law Review editors, staffers, and Alan Meese.
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a goal of consumer welfare, which weighs the potential procompetitive benefit as a justification to pursue certain behavior. That is,
behavior that was once per se illegal is now governed by a rule of
reason that weighs both the pro- and anticompetitive effects regarding civil liability. An economically informed rule of reason makes the
use of criminal sanctions problematic.
These changes to antitrust policy in the past forty-plus years create
the basis for a challenge to the reintroduction of criminal penalties
for noncollusion antitrust cases. First, this Article introduces the
criminal antitrust regime and places it in historical context. Then,
the Article explores the transformation of antitrust policy starting
from the 1970s, which shifted antitrust policy towards a singular
efficiency based goal. This focus on economic effects has significant
repercussions for criminal antitrust enforcement, as it limits the
possible use of criminal sanctions for Sherman Act § 1 and § 2
violations as well as the Robinson-Patman Act. These limitations
apply only in situations where there is no ambiguity that the
restraints in question are clearly anticompetitive. In practice, this
means that only express collusion is such a situation.
Criminal enforcement of noncollusive antitrust activity that is per
se illegal creates two potential constitutional law problems, which the
next part of the Article explores. The first is a desuetude problem,
and the second is a void for vagueness problem. As a matter of
constitutional law, these two doctrines limit possible overreach by
antitrust populists inclined to use existing law to “get tough” on
antitrust violations. The final part offers concluding thoughts on how
antitrust must promote consumer welfare and how law enforcement
must bring cases that optimally deter anticompetitive conduct but
must not bring cases that inhibit the sort of business risk taking that
promotes consumer welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust is under populist attack by politicians, media, academics, and think tanks. Even the current antitrust discussion in the
mainstream press has taken on a populist tone. For example, the
Wall Street Journal, Economist, and Financial Times—which more
instinctively tend to take a laissez faire economic approach—have
pushed for more aggressive antitrust enforcement.1 The critics of the
current antitrust approach that has lasted for forty-plus years2
make antitrust the causal factor for such things as a loss of
democracy,3 deteriorating healthcare,4 income inequality,5 and labor
force issues,6 among others. Some Democrats in Congress have
called for a fundamental rethinking of antitrust, called “A Better
Deal: Cracking Down on Corporate Monopolies and the Abuse of

1. See Theo Francis & Ryan Knutson, Wave of Megadeals Tests Antitrust Limits in U.S.,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 18, 2015, 10:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wave-of-megadealstests-antitrust-limits-in-u-s-1445213306 [https://perma.cc/YJ4T-Q6W7]; Sebastian Payne,
Time to Rethink Antitrust?, FIN . TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/72d9a1e07824-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d [https://perma.cc/R2VH-DUW4]; see also America’s Antitrust
Apparatus Prepares to Act Against Big Tech, ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/04/26/americas-antitrust-apparatus-prepares-toact-against-big-tech [https://perma.cc/5HHC-MWQ3].
2. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1211-12 (2008);
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464-66 (2003); Robert T. Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the TwentyFirst Century: A View from the Middle, 76 ST. JOHN ’S L. REV. 583, 583 (2002).
3. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Democracy, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . (forthcoming 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086260 [https://perma.cc/
7TG6-X8G2].
4. Cory Capps et al., Physician Practice Consolidation Driven by Small Acquisitions, so
Antitrust Agencies Have Few Tools to Intervene, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1556, 1556 (2017).
5. Eduardo Porter, With Competition in Tatters, the Rip of Inequality Widens, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/economy/antitrust-competitioninequality.html [https://perma.cc/8F5G-MC9M]; see also America’s Antitrust Apparatus Prepares to Act Against Big Tech, supra note 1.
6. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT , A PROPOSAL FOR
PROTECTING LOW -INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 1, 4 (2018), http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_col
lusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU67-BDBW].
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Economic and Political Power.”7 A series of policy-oriented books
also sound the alarm of bigness.8
Such populists actively hearken back to the Brandeisian concern
regarding “bigness.”9 Indeed, Carl Shapiro notes, “[n]ot since 1912,
when Teddy Roosevelt ran for President emphasizing the need to
control corporate power, have antitrust issues had such political
salience.”10 For some critics, the growing concentration of American
power is nothing less than a threat to American democracy.11
However, the populist resurgence in antitrust, taken to its logical
conclusion, would be to “reinvigorate” antitrust law with criminal
prosecutions for conduct via statutory antitrust law that is already
available and which technically still remains good law.12
I. ANTITRUST AND DETERRENCE
The basis of antitrust enforcement derives from models of optimal
deterrence.13 Under an optimal deterrence antitrust framework, a
firm or individual will be deterred in situations where the expected
costs of illegal activity exceed the expected benefits of such activity

7. A BETTER DEAL : CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE MONOPOLIES AND THE ABUSE OF
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER 1, https://www.democraticleader.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2017/07/A-Better-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GYY-YVLN].
8. See, e.g., TIM WU , THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018);
FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND : THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH (2017); SCOTT
GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON , APPLE, FACEBOOK , AND GOOGLE (2017);
JONATHAN TAPLIN , MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK , GOOGLE, AND AMAZON
CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY (1st ed. 2017).
9. See Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18;
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 300-26 (2009) (discussing Brandeis and big
business); Jonathan Sallet, Louis Brandeis: A Man for this Season, 16 COLO . TECH . L.J. 365,
367 (2018). Bigness has remained a fascination within antitrust more generally since the time
of Brandeis. See Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL . L. REV. 429,
439 (2012) (“The American antitrust discipline might owe its birth to the fear of size, but thus
far it has not acquired enough energy to recover from this fear.”).
10. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG . 1, 2 (2018).
11. See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 15-16 (2014); LUIGI ZINGALES,
A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE ix, 16-17 (2012).
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 13, 13a (2012); see also infra Parts IV.B.1-2 (discussing the
limited criminal enforcement under the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act).
13. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON .
169, 198-99 (1968).
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due to a calculation of the probability and magnitude of the
penalties.14
Criminalization in antitrust has been based on the idea that
criminalization leads policy closer to optimal deterrence because it
increases the severity of penalties.15 Criminalization has been
pushed globally in the area of cartels,16 where detection has proven
difficult and where civil fines against firms may underdeter.17
However, unlike collusion, which is done in secret because such
agreements are illegal,18 other forms of antitrust conduct covered by
the Sherman Act are not done in secret, such as traditional pricingrelated practices including exclusive dealing, tying, and bundling.19
Antitrust law contains a mix of criminal and civil penalties to
deter cartel formation and cartel activity at both the organizational
and individual levels under § 1 of the Sherman Act.20 The basis for
holding both individuals and firms accountable is that, by doing so,
antitrust is better able to address what may be different organizational and individual incentives and motivations.21 Thus, incentives
for both organizational and individual compliance potentially bring

14. See Michael Kent Block et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL.
ECON . 429, 430-31 (1981); Robert M. Feinberg, Antitrust Enforcement and Subsequent Price
Behavior, 62 REV. ECON . & STAT. 609, 611 (1980); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for
Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 657 (1983).
15. See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really
Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 235-36 (2012) (conducting a practitioner
survey that finds that “cartelists are more concerned with incarceration than corporate
fines”). This empirical finding contrasts with earlier theoretical work positing that
incarceration is less efficient than financial penalties. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 270-71 (2d ed. 2001); Becker, supra note 13, at 198-99; Richard A. Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM . CRIM . L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) [hereinafter
Optimal Sentences].
16. See Caron Beaton-Wells, Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion?, in ANTI-CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE 3, 3-4 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds.,
2015).
17. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Compliance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION 155, 157-58 (Michael A. Hitt et al. eds., 2017) (providing a review of the
literature).
18. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
19. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 40-42, 193. For an analysis of criminalization in a
European context, see Peter Whelan, Legal Certainty and Cartel Criminalisation Within the
EU Member States, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 677 (2012).
20. See Sokol, supra note 15, at 204-06.
21. See Sokol, supra note 17, at 155-56.
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antitrust closer to optimal deterrence.22 That is, criminalization
creates potential risks for firms in terms of stock market returnbased penalties, reputational penalties, debarment, and government
fines.23 These potential criminal sanctions and repercussions from
criminal sanctions create incentives for firms to monitor their
agents to ensure some level of antitrust compliance.24 However,
because of agency cost problems, the firm and its agents’ incentives
may be different.25 Hence, criminal penalties for individuals may be
appropriate in such settings.26
Many antitrust scholars propose that increased amounts of fines
and jail time bring antitrust closer to optimal deterrence for cartelrelated behavior.27 Criminal sanctions reduce cartel formation and
encourage firms and individuals to defect from existing cartels.28
This defection (via a leniency program) is important for purposes of
gathering information about the cartel for prosecution of other
cartel members.29 Without leniency and the threat of criminal
sanctions, it would be difficult to gather information about what are
secret and illegal contracts.30 Gary Becker and Richard Posner take
a different view with regard to cartels, in which they believe that
fines alone would be better than incarceration for what is an
economic act.31
In areas of traditional antitrust civil enforcement (for example,
bundling, exclusive dealing, tying, resale price maintenance (RPM),
nonprice restraints, et cetera), the case for incarceration is weaker
22. Id.
23. See id. at 165-66.
24. See id. at 157.
25. See id.
26. See Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86
YALE L.J. 619, 621 (1977); Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment
Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 31-33 (2009). But see John M. Connor & Robert H.
Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 430, 476
(2012) (showing the limits of criminal antitrust jail sentences).
27. See, e.g., Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Policy Innovations, Political Preferences,
and Cartel Prosecutions, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG . 405, 408 (2016); Werden, supra note 26, at 28,
32.
28. See D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 818 (2013).
29. See Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in 282 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 81, 107-08 (Vivek Ghosal & Johan Stennek eds., 2007).
30. See generally Sokol, supra note 28.
31. See Becker, supra note 13, at 198-99; Optimal Sentences, supra note 15, at 410.
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because these are not hidden agreements and the behavior is well
known by others in the marketplace.32 Thus, detection is not as
much of a concern. Further, in the case of behavior that might have
some offsetting procompetitive justifications generally, but not in
that particular case, monetary fines do not create significant costs
to society and serve to compensate victims.33 A large-enough fine
would therefore serve to deter future illegal behavior.34 In contrast,
locking up individuals for antitrust violations that are based on
exclusion or predation would lead to incarceration of individuals
who otherwise would be productive to society.35
Criminalization of traditional business behavior creates additional problems. In noncollusion cases, criminalization might deter
the very sort of risk taking that should be rewarded in a market
economy.36 As the Supreme Court explained in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity
to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth.37

Without the ability to undertake business practices that may
increase consumer welfare but which may be legally risky, firms do
not have a sufficient incentive to undertake investments in new
product or service offerings because of the fear of jail time.38
32. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 40-42, 259-60.
33. See Becker, supra note 13, at 198-99.
34. See id. at 199.
35. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 270-71; infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
36. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 804.
37. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
38. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. This Article does not include private
enforcement of antitrust as part of optimal deterrence for purposes of a discussion on criminal
enforcement. There is a rich literature on private enforcement. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker,
Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG . 385, 385-86 (1988); David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral?
Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM . ECON . REV. 870, 883
(1990); Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing, 95
J. POL. ECON . 1326, 1327 (1987). The problem with private enforcement is that it merely
compensates victims of potential antitrust abuses. Roger D. Blair, Antitrust Penalties:
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Coming from a different intellectual tradition, professors of
jurisprudence have also thought about the optimal criminal
system.39 Professors of jurisprudence lament that there has been a
tendency toward overcriminalization, especially for types of conduct
that should not be considered criminal.40 This concern of overcriminalization has been pronounced in the works of important
criminal law theorists such as R. A. Duff,41 Sanford Kadish,42
Andrew Ashworth,43 and Douglas Husak.44 Overall, one concern is
that criminalization should be reserved for only the most serious
crimes.45 From the standpoint of antitrust, the most serious crime
is the one that is not at all ambiguous in terms of the harm—collusion.46 For this reason, the Supreme Court refers to collusion as “the
supreme evil of antitrust.”47 The clear harm that collusion creates
has meant that for thousands of years collusion has been viewed as
Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 57, 57, 69-72. It is not helpful in terms of
punishing individuals, except perhaps indirectly. See id. at 57.
39. However, professors of jurisprudence typically do not necessarily focus on utilitarian
arguments.
40. See R. A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 1 (1st ed. 2018).
41. See id.
42. See SANFORD H. KADISH , More on Overcriminalization, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT:
ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 36, 37 (1987) (“[H]ave you considered how the inevitable process
of actual enforcement of such laws (a) so poorly serves the objectives you have in mind, and
(b) in any event produces a variety of substantial costs, including adverse consequences for
the effective enforcement of the criminal law generally? These practical considerations are so
great that they should persuade you to decriminalize the law in these areas.”).
43. Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 407, 408
(2008) (“The criminal law, however, carries with it greater social and moral significance.
Conviction of an offense tends to be regarded as something distinctive; it differs from an
adverse civil judgment or an adverse regulatory decision in that it involves public censure for
wrongdoing. The link between criminal law and punishment is therefore crucial; punishment,
in the sense of the imposition of hard treatment, requires justification, which includes, as a
necessary condition, the commission of a crime. This argument can and should be taken
further; insofar as the punishment involves restrictions on liberty, and certainly if it involves
a deprivation of liberty (e.g., imprisonment), only serious wrongdoing can be a sufficient
justification for this.”).
44. See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION : THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2008).
45. See Ashworth, supra note 43, at 408. H. L. A. Hart similarly advocates for a “moral
gradation of punishment.” See H. L. A. HART, LAW , LIBERTY AND MORALITY 34 (1963). From
the utilitarian economic approach that yields the same result, see George J. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON . 526, 531 (1970).
46. See Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. Simon, Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32
ANTITRUST BULL. 917, 924 (1987).
47. Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
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a serious moral concern, from the Babylonian Talmud48 and Christian Scriptures49 to Adam Smith.50
The discussion about optimal deterrence and antitrust provides
a framework for understanding the development of the criminal
antitrust regime from its origins to the present. The next Part
explores this antitrust history, which provides the necessary
background to understand how criminal antitrust enforcement of
collusion is different from criminal antitrust enforcement of other
types of behavior, all of which have fallen out of use in the modern
era.
II. CRIMINAL ANTITRUST THEN AND NOW
A. Early Criminal Antitrust
Originally, under the Sherman Act as enacted in 1890, all antitrust criminal offenses were misdemeanors rather than felonies.51
The classification of a misdemeanor meant that unlawful conduct
could result in criminal penalties of incarceration for a period of
time for one year or under for a violation of the Sherman Act.52 In
early antitrust history, jail time was not a preferred penalty.53 Even

48. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava Batra 9a (“There were two butchers who made
an agreement with one another that if either killed on the other’s day, the skin of his beast
should be torn up. One of them actually did kill on the other’s day, and the other went and
tore up the skin.... [T]he towns-people may inflict penalties for breach of their regulations....
[T]hey certainly have not the power to make such stipulations.”); see also Babylonion Talmud,
Tractate Bava Batra 21a (in which competition via entry is allowed). But see Dennis W.
Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics of Religion, Jewish Survival, and Jewish Attitudes
Toward Competition in Torah Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD . 253, 269 (2001) (noting that some
subsequent Rabbinical commentary was not procompetitive).
49. Kenneth Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane, Christianity and Antitrust, in CHRISTIANITY AND
ECONOMIC REGULATION (Daniel A. Crane & Samuel Gregg, eds.) (forthcoming Cambridge
University Press).
50. 1 ADAM SMITH , AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. I, at 200 (9th ed. 1979) (“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
some contrivance to raise prices.”).
51. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)).
52. Id.
53. See Gregory J. Werden, Individual Accountability Under the Sherman Act: The Early
Years, 31 ANTITRUST 100, 100 (2017).
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for cartels, criminal enforcement of antitrust was quite rare.54
Members of cartels were incarcerated once in 1921,55 but not again
until 1959.56 Criminal offenses by companies also were not significant in antitrust law relative to civil cases.57 There was some criminal enforcement of non “hard core” collusion prior to World War II
(WWII), with infrequent jail time, mostly dealing with organized
labor.58 When there was significant criminal enforcement for noncartel matters, particularly during the largest period of antitrust
criminal enforcement during the tenure of Thurman Arnold as
head of the DOJ Antitrust Division, the criminal penalties were
fines rather than jail time and the severity of the penalties were
rather weak.59
B. The Rise of Modern Criminal Enforcement
The rise of criminal antitrust enforcement in the 1970s provides
some background as to the current state of criminal enforcement of
U.S. antitrust law. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
(APPA) increased criminal penalties.60 Congress transformed
antitrust criminal penalties from misdemeanors to felonies.61 It also
increased the maximum term of imprisonment for antitrust conduct
from one year to three years.62

54. See Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels
and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 693, 695 (2001).
55. See United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 280 F. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
56. United States v. McDonough Co., 180 F. Supp. 511, 514 (S.D. Ohio 1959).
57. See Werden, supra note 53; Richard A. Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive,
47 VA. L. REV. 929, 984-85 (1961) (appendix).
58. See Werden, supra note 53.
59. Id. at 102.
60. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012)).
61. Id.
62. Id. Earlier models and empirical work suggested that if penalties go up and there are
multiple dimensions of responses by actual and potential defendants, then one gets:
(1) greater deterrence, (2) greater defensive efforts “in disguising their actions” if firms do
engage in wrongdoing, (3) greater defensive efforts to steer clear of the grey area to avoid false
charges, and (4) conditional on indictments, greater efforts to defend against charges. See
Edward A. Snyder, The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforcement, 33 J.L.
& ECON . 439, 443 (1990). With a longer time series, the empirical results do not follow the
theory.
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Increased vigor by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust
Division to prosecute collusion with higher sentences, including
incarceration, matched Congress’s decision to increase criminal penalties.63 In 1977, the DOJ promulgated guidelines that pushed for
higher jail terms for antitrust offenses.64 The DOJ’s focus was on
cartel enforcement and was based on a sense that antitrust penalties did not sufficiently deter wrongdoing.65 It still took a number
of years for the new maximum criminal penalties to be used, as
1981 was the first time that courts imposed the maximum prison
term of three years as a penalty for a collusion case.66
Penalties have not remained static since the 1970s. Rather, there
has been an incremental increase in both fines and criminalization
with regard to collusion.67 In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
applied the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (passed in 1984) to cartel
offenses.68 Further, in 1990, the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990
increased the potential monetary penalties for violations of the
Sherman Act.69 Congress increased penal terms again in 2004 under
the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act
(ACPERA), this time to a maximum of ten years.70
These financial penalties for firms are costly and therefore impact
firm decision making with regard to antitrust related risk.71 A metaanalysis of cartel scholarship concludes that “at a fundamental level, the most important result [of the academic literature] is that
high fines are a crucially important element of deterrence.”72
63. See generally Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in
Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978) (providing an overview of this
transformation).
64. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 27, at 410-11.
65. See id.; Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement,
57 J.L. & ECON. S51 (2014).
66. See Baker, supra note 54 (discussing the evolution of criminal antitrust).
67. See generally id.
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM ’N 2016). For
an argument for the increases in sanctions in the Sentencing Guidelines for hard-core
antitrust crimes, see generally Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is the Punishment Worth the Cost?, 27 AM . CRIM . L. REV. 331 (1989).
69. Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4, 104 Stat. 2879, 2880.
70. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661, 668.
71. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 54, at 712.
72. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING , AN ASSESSMENT OF DISCRETIONARY PENALTY REGIMES 1, 8
(2009), https://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/30-An-assessment-of-the-
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The record of enforcement of criminal cases outside of explicit
collusion has been limited since WWII.73 More than a generation has
passed since there have been any criminal indictments, let alone jail
time, for § 1 and § 2 noncollusion cases. The DOJ has brought a
single criminal noncollusion antitrust case since the introduction of
the felony penalties.
C. The Judicial Structure of Antitrust Law and Its
Implications on Criminal Enforcement
Even though antitrust is based on statute, it has a common-law
style of development.74 In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court made this explicit, stating “[f]rom
the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a commonlaw statute.”75 However, the Court had regularly made statements
as to the common-law nature of the Sherman Act in prior cases.76
Even though antitrust is commonlaw-like in its application, it
works differently than other types of common law. There is a
significant history to antitrust shifting with time, thereby limiting
stare decisis. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, the Court
explained:
UK-Discretionary-Penalties-Regime.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVP4-AVPH].
73. Indictments for monopolization include: United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,061, at 52,424 (Apr. 12, 1961) (reporting the indictment for
monopolization of the manufacture and sale of railroad locomotives); United States v. United
Fruit Co., 11 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,063, at 52,528 (July 16, 1963) (reporting the
indictment for monopolization of the banana market in seven states). These cases did not end
up as anything more than just indictments. For cases with jail time, see infra Part IV.B.1; see
also United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 475 F.2d 1241, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1973).
This was the year before antitrust violations became a felony. See Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 16 (2012)).
74. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 633 (1982); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1275 (2001); Lars Noah,
Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM . &
MARY L. REV. 1463, 1480 (2000). But see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 270 (1986).
75. 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
76. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[T]he general presumption that
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman
Act.”).
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As a charter of [economic] freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a
generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed
definitions which might either work injury to legitimate
enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by
providing loopholes for escape.77

More recently, in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the Court
concluded, “[w]e have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal
analysis as economic understanding evolves and ... to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”78
This conceptualization by the Court of a consumer welfare-based
singular goal for antitrust has existed only for a generation.79 In its
earlier years, the Court found ways to allow certain criminal behavior due to multiple goals, and also encouraged behavior that was
not consumer welfare enhancing.80
III. ANTITRUST AND GOALS
In a world with multiple goals of antitrust that included the
protection of small businesses against competition, the case for
criminal enforcement of noncollusion behavior may have had some
justification (even if it was misguided).81 However, once the goals
changed to a singular goal that was based on economic analysis in
which efficiencies were welcomed, this changed the moral and legal
basis for business practices.82 The idea that efficiency was somehow
immoral was laid to rest, and instead morality focused on the
importance of lower prices, increased quality, and increased innovation for consumers.83 Similarly, a change from per se illegality
77. 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
78. 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412-13 (2015).
79. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464 (2003).
80. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
81. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1428-30 (1990).
82. See generally Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & ECON . 7 (1966).
83. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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to a rule of reason made criminal enforcement problematic as it set
a much lower standard for incarceration for individuals than other
criminal statutes.84
Antitrust in the premodern era, and in particular, the late 1940s
to the early 1970s, was an area of antitrust populism that embraced
multiple goals both by the antitrust agencies85 and the Supreme
Court.86 Antitrust populism manifested itself in Supreme Court
rulings that opened up antitrust liability both criminally and civilly
for all sorts of price and nonprice offenses and rejected outright
efficiencies as irrelevant for mergers.87 These other goals included
the protection from competition of small and inefficient businesses
over competitors who would lower prices, improve quality, and/or
increase innovation.88
Several cases embody the tradition of noneconomic goals. In
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, the Second Circuit noted
that “one of [antitrust’s] purposes was to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.”89 Similarly, the Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
cautioned that “we cannot fail to recognize Congress’[s] desire to
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
84. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
85. See ROBERT H. BORK , THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 4 (1978); William E. Kovacic, Failed
Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for
Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989); William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The
Federal Trade Commission as an Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and
Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085 (2015); Kovacic, supra note 79.
86. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-54
(1968); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l
Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,
375 (1967); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Phila.
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96
(1947); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For a defense of
this tradition, see, for example, Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979).
87. See Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 580 (“Possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality.”).
88. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected
Classes, 88 MICH . L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1989).
89. 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.”90 This populist impulse in antitrust that did
not place economic analysis in the forefront (and indeed shifting
trends in antitrust economics) meant that, the Supreme Court and
lower courts oftentimes ruled in ways that go against sound
economics by the standard we use today. This period from the late
1940s to late 1970s is what Professor Donald Turner termed
antitrust’s “inhospitality tradition.”91
The inhospitability tradition was one in which antitrust courts
created doctrines that were not based solely on industrial organization economic considerations as we understand them today.92 As
a result, there were a number of goals in antitrust that harmed
consumers.93 For example, courts were concerned about competitors
(even inefficient ones) rather than consumers in mergers,94 ignored
merger efficiencies and treated them as unlawful,95 found various
marketing practices for vertical price and nonprice restraints to be
per se illegal,96 significantly limited unilateral refusals to deal,97
limited intellectual property rights,98 were overinclusive in their
90. 370 U.S. at 344.
91. See Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded
Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1322 & n.124
(2013). The original citation is to Turner’s speech to the Antitrust Section of the New York
State Bar Association in which Turner said, “I approach territorial and customer restrictions
not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust.” See
id. (citing Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N ANTITRUST
L. SYMP. 1, 1-2); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Leveraged Buyouts:
An Efficiency Assessment, in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1, 21 n.24 (Lucian
Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990).
92. See Meese, supra note 91, at 1324-25, 1331-32, 1370.
93. See id. at 1322-23, 1334.
94. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 345-46; Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 428
(“[G]reat industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results.”).
95. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen
competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting
competition.”).
96. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373 (1967); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911).
97. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
98. See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use,
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approach to ancillary restraints,99 and took a view that efficient
price discrimination that lowers prices for consumers should be per
se illegal.100
Multiple goals also muddled earlier antitrust cases, including
those addressing collusion. For example, during the period of the
Great Depression, courts did not strictly enforce criminal antitrust
laws.101 As Professors William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro note, “in
the depths of the Depression, even the Court’s stand against naked
horizontal output restrictions wavered.”102 In Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, the Court found that a conspiracy that allowed
for output restriction of uniform pricing by coal producers did not
violate the Sherman Act.103 Such a case, if brought today with a singular goal of consumer welfare, would have come out the opposite
way.
This tradition of economic folly gave way to a singular goal based
on economic effects. As such, in conduct cases via a rule of reason
and in mergers based on economically guided merger guidelines, an
economics-based approach is not criminally enforced but, in fact,
more generally, it is civilly subject to a weighing of pro- and anticompetitive harms.104 Though antitrust has always been subject to
the economics of its time,105 economic analysis took a more central
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER : PATENTS, FRANCHISING ,
TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 11-14 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970).
99. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
100. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967); FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
101. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON . PERSP. 43, 46-49 (2000).
102. See id. at 47.
103. 288 U.S. 344, 376 (1933).
104. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust
Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2506-07 (2013); Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 101;
Acting Assistant Attorney General Andrew Finch Delivers Remarks at Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-delivers-remarks-global-antitrust
[https://perma.cc/LMT2-4LDF] (“Economics has played, and will continue to play, a
fundamental role in antitrust enforcement.”). But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW , 1836-1937, at 268 (1991) (“One of the great myths about American antitrust
policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust problems only in the
1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’ in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models.
Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception.”).
105. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 268.
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role in the mid-1970s as a result of shifts in academic thinking that
began in the 1950s and 1960s.106
The notion that antitrust should be based on a consumer-welfare
calculation (though not always clear as to what the Court meant by
consumer welfare)107 soon followed from Continental T. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.108 In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme
Court articulated, “[The Congressional floor debates] suggest that
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”109 A few years later, the Supreme Court returned to goals of
antitrust in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma when it noted that “[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing
the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output
is not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.”110
In those areas in which the academic consensus on economic
practices has developed, the Supreme Court has shifted to rule of
reason from per se illegality.111 This is perhaps clearest in Leegin.
There, the Court stated:
Though each side of the debate can find sources to support its
position, it suffices to say here that economics literature is
replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s
use of resale price maintenance....
106. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant
Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The
Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM . BUS. L. REV. 1 (analyzing the fusion of Chicago
and Harvard traditions); see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Robert H.
Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM . L. REV. 363 (1965); Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Aaron
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW . U. L. REV. 281,
290 (1957); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON . 137, 143-67 (1958).
107. Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON . 133 (2011).
108. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
109. 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
110. 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (emphasis added).
111. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 58 (“Today, the links between economics
and law have been institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective in
law schools, extensive and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with the
substantial presence of economists in the government antitrust agencies.”).
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Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be
stated with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition
and decrease output.”
Were the Court now to conclude that vertical price restraints
should be per se illegal based on administrative costs, we would
undermine, if not overrule, the traditional “demanding standards” for adopting per se rules.112

Leegin involved a shift from per se illegality to the rule of reason.113
While Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States first
introduced the rule of reason,114 the rule of reason has been better
defined over the last thirty years.115 However, full blown rule of
reason cases decided on the merits are rare.116 As a consequence, a
number of areas of antitrust law in the area of vertical restraints,
if anything, has moved to de facto per se legality.117 As a result of
the current antitrust paradigm, notice and consistency currently
exists in court cases because of the economic basis of such cases.118
As the next Part suggests, a shift to more criminal enforcement of
such cases threaten both notice and consistency.
The above review of shifts in antitrust doctrinal development as
well as policy thinking sets up the next part of the Article. Because
the current antitrust regime is fundamentally different than a
generation ago, a return to certain forms of antitrust in the criminal
area creates potentially troubling constitutional concerns with regard to both desuetude and void for vagueness.

112. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889, 894-95 (2007)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 882.
114. 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911).
115. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern
Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733-34 (2012).
116. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1265, 1268; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO . MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009).
117. See D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the
Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1008 (2013).
118. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 51-52.
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IV. DESUETUDE
A. Desuetude and Its Meaning
Desuetude is a concept where a practice that has been fixed by
law loses its authority due to a lack of usage.119 When this lack of
usage has been long enough, a “negative custom” of nonusage replaces the usage of the law.120 Nonusage for a lengthy period of time
suggests either that the legal practice is obsolete or was never legitimate in the first place.121
The basis of desuetude originated during the Roman Empire and
from the work of Emporers Julian and Justinian.122 The desuetude
idea has been continuously recognized in Western civilization since
that time.123
There is a temporal element to desuetude. As Richard Albert explains, “[s]tatutory desuetude occurs when some combination of the
sustained non-application of a law, contrary practice over a significant duration of time, official disregard and the tacit consent of
public and political actors leads to the implicit repeal of that law.”124
That is, lack of use of the statute is not enough.125 Desuetude is a
function of the amount of time since the government enforced the
statute.126
The types of cases that often get brought up in the context of desuetude are ones that address issues of morality: “Most unenforced
119. See Cory R. Chivers, Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992
UTAH L. REV. 449, 449.
120. John F. Stinneford, Death Deseutude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM . & MARY L. REV.
531, 537 (2014).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 565-66 n.159.
123. Id. at 566.
124. Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM . J.
COMP. L. 641, 643 (2014); see also Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking:
Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 81 (1976) (“‘Desuetude’ is the
ancient doctrine that long and continuous failure to enforce a statute, coupled wi[t]h open and
widespread violation of it by the populace, is tantamount to repeal of the statute.” (footnote
omitted)).
125. See Allen, supra note 124, at 81-82 (quoting State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973)).
126. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 63
(1961).
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criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections to established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to
continue our conduct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve
our morals.”127 Issues that once caused moral outrage but are no
longer viewed that way under contemporary communal standards
are desuete.128 The fairness-related issue regarding morality is best
summed up by Arthur Bonfield:
First, a very long-continued and well-settled failure to enforce a
widely-ignored statute is as much a positive expression of public
policy as would be its express legislative abrogation. The reason
for this is that such a protracted course of administrative
conduct must at least reflect the electorate’s acquiescence to the
provision’s demise as effective law. Otherwise, the politically
responsive administrators of our penal laws would have
suffered—over such an appreciable period—the consequences of
their long disregard of public preference. Second, when the
community has acquiesced in an enactment’s long-continued
administrative nullification by not terminating it, the provision
disappears as law in any meaningful sense. It is neither observed nor enforced, and is virtually eradicated from the legal
consciousness of the body politic.129

It is only in the criminal context that statutes would fall in disuse.130
In the civil context, potential private plaintiffs that find statutes potentially advantageous are likely to use them for settling or winning
a case.131 However, repealing criminal laws are more difficult.132
William Stuntz notes,
[t]here is good reason to believe that the level of legislative
inertia in such cases—the cost of undoing that which would not
be done today—is higher for criminal statutes than for other
127. THURMAN W. ARNOLD , THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935).
128. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA
L. REV. 389, 395 (1964).
129. Id. at 391 (footnotes omitted).
130. See Hillary Greene, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal
Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 173 (1997).
131. See id.
132. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 591 (2001).
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sorts of legislation. Which means that the statute books contain
a host of crimes that are not crimes at all in terms of popular
understandings.133

Thus, unlike civil laws, criminal laws fall into disuse rather than
being repealed.
Desuetude has an important function in understanding types of
conduct. In her analysis of desuetude, Hillary Greene explains that
“[t]he true significance of nonenforcement becomes clearer when one
stops to consider what it means to make something a crime.”134 That
is, a crime is an action taken that society is willing to enforce.135 As
a consequence, the lack of enforcement of such a crime suggests that
society may not really want to enforce the statute.136 Greene explains that “[n]onenforcement of a criminal statute could, in short,
effectively decriminalize the conduct prescribed by the statute.”137
Nonenforcement of a statute suggests that the risk of prosecution
is zero, or close to it.138 Thus, to overturn a criminal statute that is
unenforced creates problems of standing.139 When there is no enforcement, it is difficult to challenge the constitutionality of the
law.140 Thus, the sudden enforcement of obsolete statutes creates
due process concerns because the statutes can be used in a discriminatory manner.141 Further desuete statutes also create problems
of notice. Both commentators and courts have identified that the

133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Greene, supra note 130, at 182.
135. See id.
136. Stuntz, supra note 132, at 592 (“Crimes that go unenforced for a substantial period
of time should no longer be treated as crimes. Lack of enforcement constitutes fairly strong
evidence for the proposition that the crime would not be a crime if the issue were to be
resolved by majoritarian politics today.”); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (“[A] criminal law
cannot be enforced if it has lost public support.”).
137. Greene, supra note 130, at 183.
138. See id. at 187.
139. See id.
140. Id.; see also Bonfield, supra note 128, at 390.
141. See Bonfield, supra note 128, at 410; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 154 (2d ed. 1986).
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enforcement of obsolete statutes creates problems of fair notice.142
This in turn creates due process concerns.143
The primary basis for desuetude as a doctrine is the concept that
the long nonusage of the law, despite numerous opportunities to
do so, creates negative customs.144 These negative customs in turn
prohibit the subsequent reinforcement of the statute.145 The common-law tradition, as a tradition of custom and long usage, is the
basis for law.146 Likewise, nonuse creates the basis for not enforcing
the law.147
What exactly constitutes long use (or disuse) is not totally clear.
For example, Scottish law considered fifty years sufficient for a law
to fall into disuse.148 In contrast, Spanish law required only ten
years for a law to fall in disuse for purposes of desuetude.149 Other
lengths of time vary from one hundred years to forty years to the
discretion of the judge.150
Not all scholars believe the desuetude is a viable legal theory
in practice.151 A number of legal commentators suggest that desuetude is not recognized by American law.152 However, the basis of
142. See Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95, 107 (Iowa 1840) (arguing that it is “contrary to the
spirit of that Anglo-Saxon liberty ... to revive, without notice, an obsolete statute, one in
relation to which long disuse and a contrary policy had induced a reasonable belief that it was
no longer in force”); Stuntz, supra note 132, at 592. But see Stinneford, supra note 120, at 567
(“[N]otice ... has not historically been the primary justification for the doctrine of desuetude.”).
143. Bonfield, supra note 128, at 415-18.
144. See Stinneford, supra note 120, at 565.
145. See, e.g., 1 JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND bk. I, at 18 (James
Ivory ed., 1824) (“[A]s a posterior statute may repeal or derogate from a prior, so a posterior
custom may repeal or derogate from a prior statute, even though that prior statute should
contain a clause forbidding all usages that might tend to weaken it: For the contrary
immemorial custom sufficiently presumes the will of the community to alter the law in all its
clauses, and particularly in that which was intended to secure it against alteration; and this
presumed will of the people operates as strongly as their express declaration.”).
146. Stinneford, supra note 120, at 561.
147. See id. at 569.
148. DAINES BARRINGTON , OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES FROM MAGNA
CHARTA TO THE TWENTY-FIRST OF JAMES I CAP. XXVII 39 (3d ed. 1769).
149. Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 353, 364 (1859).
150. 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 138-39 (William
Holloway trans., 1867).
151. See Bonfield, supra note 128, at 394, 396.
152. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 124, at 652 (“Nor does the United States recognize
desuetude.”); Allen, supra note 124, at 81-82; Chivers, supra note 119, at 449; Note,
Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2211 (2006) (“What of those American jurisdictions that
have accepted the doctrine? Little effort is needed to canvass the relevant case law, given that
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desuetude—which as common law is based on custom over time—
has a deep philosophical basis in the writings of Anglo-American
thinkers such as Edward Coke, William Blackstone, John Adams,
and James Wilson.153 Desuetude has also appealed to more modern
thinkers such as Alexander Bickel,154 Guido Calabresi,155 and Cass
Sunstein.156
Doubters of an American doctrine of desuetude point to the Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson
Co.157 However, that cases’s facts are highly specific, which suggests
the Court’s rejection of the doctrine specifically in those circumstances.158 This narrow reading of Thompson is justified given the
facts of the case. Thompson regarded a law that prohibited racial
discrimination in the food service industry based on the local
Washington Acts of 1872 and 1873.159 The case did not totally rule

West Virginia alone recognizes desuetude as a valid defense.... Earlier decisions in other state
courts recognizing the doctrine have been overturned, leaving West Virginia as an outlier in
this field.” (footnote omitted)). But some federal cases acknowledge desuetude. See Cent. Nat’l
Bank of Mattoon v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 906 (7th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Jones, 347 F. Supp. 2d 626, 628-29 (E.D. Wis. 2004); United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp.
318, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). One could even argue that the Supreme Court at least implicitly
has recognized desuetude in dicta. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 203 (2000) (“Although the Court in Linda R.S. recited the ‘logical
nexus’ analysis of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, ... (1968), which has since fallen into desuetude,
‘it is clear that standing was denied ... because of the unlikelihood that the relief requested
would redress appellant’s claimed injury.” (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 n.24 (1978))).
153. Stinneford, supra note 120, at 562; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 64 (1979) (explaining that common law is custom that enjoys “long
and immemorial usage” and “universal reception throughout the kingdom”); EDWARD COKE,
THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
OF SIR EDWARD COKE 563, 563 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (“Customes are defined to be a Law,
or Right not written, which being established by long use, and the consent of our Ancestors,
hath been, and is daily practised.”); 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 453 (James DeWitt
Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1896) (“It is the characteristic of a system of common
law that it be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniencies of
the people, by whom it is appointed.”).
154. See generally Bickel, supra note 141.
155. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66
(1982).
156. See generally Sunstein, supra note 136.
157. 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
158. See Greene, supra note 130, at 192.
159. Thompson, 346 U.S. at 102-03.
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out judicial discretion regarding desuetude.160 Rather, the Court left
open this possibility, though it did not articulate the specific situations in which desuetude would occur.161 As the Court stated,
“[c]ases of hardship are put where criminal laws so long in disuse as
to be no longer known to exist are enforced against innocent parties.
But that condition does not bear on the continuing validity of the
law; it is only an ameliorating factor in enforcement.”162 Examining
the ameliorating factor in Thompson, the prosecutions that served
as the basis of the case did not come as a surprise.163 Rather, prosecutors warned of their intention to prosecute violations.164
B. Desuetude in Antitrust
Having provided an overview of desuetude, this Part applies the
doctrine of desuetude to antitrust. The case for applying desuetude
to both Sherman Act cases and Robinson-Patman cases is strong.
There has been no criminal indictment of any Sherman Act noncollusion offenses since the 1970s165 and no Robinson-Patman
criminal indictment cases since the late 1950s.166 During this period,
the moral perception of antitrust criminality changed in the antitrust agencies, the antitrust bar, and academics.167 The only discussion of criminal penalties of the current antitrust era has been
reserved for collusion.168

160. See id. at 117; see also Greene, supra note 130, at 191.
161. See Thompson, 346 U.S. at 117; see also Greene, supra note 130, at 191-92.
162. Thompson, 346 U.S. at 117.
163. See Greene, supra note 130, at 191.
164. Id.; see also Bonfield, supra note 128, at 431.
165. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation
of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Conn. 1981), aff’d, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981).
166. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (Eighth) (2018), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/criminal-enforcement.
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1. Sherman Act Criminal Enforcement Outside of Explicit
Collusion
Sherman Act criminal enforcement outside of cartels has been
historically very rare.169 This is particularly true outside of the collusion context for practices involving Sherman § 1. It is even more
rare for criminal enforcement of Sherman § 2 activity.170 Professors
William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga summarize the DOJ’s criminal
enforcement as follows:
During the first fifty years of antitrust enforcement under the
Sherman Act, of 252 criminal prosecutions only twenty-four
resulted in jail sentences, and only eleven of those involved
businessmen (the rest were trade-union leaders). Moreover, ten
of the eleven cases involved acts of violence, threats, and other
forms of intimidation, and the remaining jail sentence was
suspended. From 1940 to 1955 only eleven prison sentences were
imposed, and in almost every case the sentences were suspended. It was not until 1959 that a prison sentence was
imposed for price-fixing alone, in which no acts of violence or
union misconduct were involved. In that case the court imposed
a ninety-day prison term on four individuals and fined each
$5,000.171

The nature of criminal enforcement also changed between the early
period of enforcement to the start of the famous heavy electric
equipment cartel cases of the late 1950s172 through the renewed emphasis on criminal cartel enforcement in the late 1970s.173 According
to empirical work by Joseph Gallo and his coauthors, incarceration
was very rare in the pre-1963 antitrust era, in which prison was
imposed in only 24 of 463 criminal convictions (5.1 percent).174
Similarly, during the 1963 to 1973 period, 4.8 percent of criminal

169. See Baker, supra note 54, at 695.
170. See id.
171. WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM 52 (1986).
172. Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal
Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM . SOC. REV. 837, 838 (1993).
173. See generally Joseph C. Gallo et al., Guess Who Came to Dinner: An Empirical Study
of Federal Antitrust Enforcement for the Period 1963-1984, 2 REV. INDUS. ORG. 106 (1985).
174. Id. at 121.
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convictions resulted in incarceration.175 The APPA changed the nature of enforcement.176 Since its passage through 1984 (the end of
the Reagan administration’s first term), 20 percent of criminal convictions resulted in incarceration.177 All of these convictions and jail
sentences were for collusion, except for monopolization convictions
in 1969 (six months in jail) and 1973 (thirty days in jail).178 None of
these jail sentences for monopolization occurred after antitrust
offenses became felonies.179
There is some discrepancy between Gallo’s work and Posner’s
1970 paper that statistically examines antitrust enforcement.180
According to Posner, who based his data on the Commerce Clearing
House “Bluebook” summaries of DOJ Antitrust cases,181 the only
criminal monopolization jail sentences were between 1925 and 1929,
which included a conviction for violence, and a noncriminal monopolization conviction in 1969.182 Even if both Posner and Gallo are
together both correct about the total number of criminal monopolization convictions that resulted in incarceration, the total number
of incarcerations for monopolization in the history of the Sherman
Act is incredibly rare and has not been a part of antitrust life for
more than a generation.183
The most recent criminal action against a noncollusion case is
instructive of how far things have changed in terms of thinking
about antitrust. In 1978, the DOJ indicted a firm for criminal RPM,
which resulted in a nolo contendere plea and a fine.184 The ability to
threaten criminal sanctions for behavior that is not typically used
to extract harsher penalties otherwise is the type of due process
concern that animates the support for desuetude from thinkers such
175. Id.
176. See id.; see also Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88
Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012)).
177. Gallo et al., supra note 173, at 121.
178. Id. at 122.
179. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, § 3, 88 Stat. at 1708 (1974).
180. Compare Gallo et al., supra note 173, at 121 (explaining infrequent conviction), with
Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON . 365, 366-67
(1970).
181. See Posner, supra note 180, at 366-67.
182. Id. at 391.
183. See Baker, supra note 54, at 695.
184. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-10 (D.
Conn. 1981), aff ’d, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981).
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as Bickel and Sunstein.185 Even today, forty years after the indictment, desuetude via nonenforcement of criminal RPM could create
negative custom to prevent its current application.186 Given changes
in RPM policy moving it from per se to rule of reason, which itself
is based on an economic consensus that there may be procompetitive
effects to RPM,187 such an indictment today would be highly unlikely
and may even violate the void for vagueness doctrine as discussed
further in the next Part.188
Notice in antitrust regarding nonenforcement of criminal Sherman Act activity is problematic.189 The DOJ has shown prosecutorial
discretion not merely by not bringing such challenges, but also by
making clear that criminal enforcement is reserved for cartels.190
Guidance from the DOJ provides notice for naked restraints that are
per se illegal.191 Yet, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations,192 Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource
Professionals,193 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors,194 and the DOJ Antitrust Division Manual195 are silent
regarding criminal prosecution for other sorts of violations. The lack
of discussion of criminal sanctions for other sorts of antitrust conduct strengthens the sense that the norm for enforcement has
185. See generally Bickell, supra note 141; Sunstein, supra note 136.
186. See generally Stinneford, supra note 120.
187. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Franchising and Exclusive Distribution:
Adaptation and Antitrust, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 387, 408 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015); James C. Cooper et al.,
Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG . 639, 648-49 (2005).
188. See infra Part V.
189. See Bonfield, supra note 128, at 415-18 (discussing fair notice problems outside of
antitrust).
190. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED . TRADE COMM ’N , ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2 (1995).
191. See id. (“Conduct that the Department prosecutes criminally is limited to traditional
per se offenses of the law, which typically involve price-fixing, customer allocation, [and] bidrigging.”).
192. Id.
193. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED . TRADE COMM ’N , ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 4 (2016) (“Going forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally
against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements.”).
194. FED. TRADE COMM ’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 3 (2000) (“The Department of Justice prosecutes
participants in hard-core cartel agreements criminally.”).
195. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-8 (5th ed. 2017) (identifying
only price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation schemes).
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shifted to one of criminal nonenforcement for noncollusive conduct.
Thus, a revival of criminal enforcement for Sherman Act violations
that are noncollusive are desuete and not valid as statutes for
further criminal enforcement.
2. Enforcement of Robinson-Patman
The Robinson-Patman Act was passed as a statute to protect
small retailers against larger and more efficient retailers.196 The
FTC aggressively enforced civil Robinson-Patman cases in the 1950s
and 1960s.197 From an economic standpoint, Robinson-Patman enforcement is retrograde and hurts the most vulnerable consumers
by having them pay higher prices than they should for various goods
and for retarding necessary economies of scale.198
Though rare, there have been criminal cases brought by the DOJ
under the Robinson-Patman Act.199 Yet, Robinson-Patman enforcement is particularly problematic regarding desuetude from the
standpoint of both notice and duration. This is both true of criminal
and civil Robinson-Patman cases brought by the DOJ and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).200 There has been only a single
government enforcement action of Robinson-Patman since the
George H.W. Bush administration (and an odd case at that), and no
criminal enforcement since the late 1950s.201
a. DOJ Enforcement of Robinson-Patman
In the 1970s, the DOJ unilaterally stopped its Robinson-Patman
enforcement, which meant an end to the possibility of criminal enforcement.202 In the 1977 Report on the Robinson-Patman Act, the
196. D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 2064, 2069-70
(2015).
197. Id. at 2071 (“In the first thirty-four years of the Act (1937-71), the FTC issued almost
1400 Robinson-Patman complaints.”).
198. Lamentably, the current wave of antitrust populism wants to hurt consumers through
higher prices.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, 151 F. Supp. 438, 439
(D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 89 F. Supp. 112, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
200. See generally Sokol, supra note 196.
201. See id. at 2071-75.
202. See id. at 2075.
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DOJ called the Act “protectionist” and economic legislation that had
“deleterious impact upon competition.”203 The DOJ also suggested
that “serious consideration” should be given to the repeal of the
Robinson-Patman Act.204
b. FTC Enforcement of Robinson-Patman
The FTC has been the sole enforcer of Robinson-Patman (civilly)
since the 1950s.205 During 1965 to 1968, the period of its most significant enforcement, the FTC averaged ninety-seven new RobinsonPatman investigations per year.206 Of these investigations, the FTC
averaged twenty-seven complaints annually.207 A number of these
investigations resulted in decided cases, which were pro-plaintiff.208
Such case law had significant repercussions. The nadir of such cases
were Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.209 and FTC v. Morton
Salt Co.210
The FTC by the late 1970s had significantly curtailed its
Robinson-Patman civil enforcement.211 In 1975, the House Small
Business Committee held hearings regarding Robinson-Patman
enforcement.212 During the hearings, the FTC Bureau of Economics
203. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON -PATMAN
ACT 250 (1977).
204. Id. at 260-63.
205. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, FED . TRADE COMM ’N , ANALYTICAL
APPROACHES AND INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES FOR IMPLEMENTING COMPETITION POLICY
REFORMS BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION , (1995), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/418071/951212comppolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ2K-UUDB].
206. Sokol, supra note 196, at 2073.
207. Id.
208. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 (1948).
209. 386 U.S. 685 (1967); see BORK , supra note 85, at 387 (“There is no economic theory
worthy of the name that could find an injury to competition on the facts of the case.
Defendants were convicted not of injuring competition but, quite simply, of competing.”); Ward
S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 70
(1967).
210. 334 U.S. 37 (1948); see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and
Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 125 (2001) (“The secondary-line
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act are irritating to almost anyone who is serious about
antitrust.”).
211. See Sokol, supra note 196, at 2071-75.
212. See Recent Efforts to Amend or Repeal the Robinson-Patman Act—Part 2: Hearings
Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act, and Related Matters of
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Director, Professor F. M. Scherer, testified regarding RobinsonPatman enforcement.213 Scherer’s congressional testimony illustrated the anticompetitive effect of Robinson-Patman enforcement.214
This testimony reflected how in the 1970s the FTC brought fewer
Robinson-Patman cases because such cases hurt consumers and
helped small and inefficient competitors.215
By the mid-1970s, enforcement was down considerably as the
FTC initiated four Robinson-Patman investigations and three complaints per annum.216 On the civil enforcement side, the FTC has
brought only a single Robinson-Patman case since the end of the
George H.W. Bush era.217
3. The Overall View of Robinson-Patman
Government action, or lack thereof, reflects a broader societal understanding of Robinson-Patman. Robert Bork, who shaped modern
antitrust law more than any other thinker, called Robinson-Patman
“antitrust’s least glorious hour” in 1978.218 Richard Posner authored
a monograph attacking Robinson-Patman in 1976.219 Among more
modern thinkers, the most celebrated living professor of antitrust,
Herbert Hovenkamp, laments that Robinson-Patman has “all but
evaded the economic revolution in antitrust.”220 This academic
consensus on the Robinson-Patman Act is also shared by the
practitioner community.221 The congressionally appointed Antitrust
Modernization Commission in 2007 called for the repeal of the
Robinson-Patman Act.222
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter Recent Efforts].
213. Id. (statement of Frederic M. Scherer, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade
Commission).
214. See id.; see also Sokol, supra note 196, at 2075.
215. See Recent Efforts, supra note 212, at 141-44; Sokol, supra note 196, at 2075.
216. Sokol, supra note 196, at 2075.
217. Id. at 2072.
218. BORK , supra note 85, at 382.
219. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ROBINSON -PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (1976).
220. Hovenkamp, supra note 210, at 125.
221. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM ’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M9Q5-P7ZL].
222. Id. at 312.
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Given that the last criminal Robinson-Patman case is from the
late 1950s (reaching the Supreme Court in the early 1960s) with no
subsequent cases since that time,223 unilateral nonenforcement of
the criminal statutes from the DOJ in the late 1970s,224 and no federal civil enforcement of any sort of Robinson-Patman cases by the
FTC,225 along with academic and bipartisan support for major modification or repeal of the statute,226 any criminal Robinson-Patman
enforcement would today be subject to the doctrine of desuetude.
V. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Desuetude is not the only means by which to attack the potential
reuse of a criminal antitrust aspect to noncollusion based conduct
that has fallen in disuse. One could make an argument that the void
for vagueness doctrine applies with regard to the Sherman Act for
noncollusion criminal enforcement.227 Void for vagueness is a doctrine where the law in question is too vague to provide notice of the
type of conduct that is to be deemed illegal.228 The linkage between
desuetude and vagueness is that “[a] penal enactment which is linguistically clear, but has been notoriously ignored by both its
administrators and the community for an unduly extended period,
imparts no more fair notice of its proscriptions than a statute which
is phrased in vague terms.”229
The rule of reason for Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 cases complicates
the ability to bring criminal penalties, such as incarceration, to antitrust for cases that would fall under this legal doctrine. Rule of
reason liability in practice means that any prosecution would necessarily have a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard that seems
inapplicable to conduct that may have a procompetitive effect.230

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
(1966).
229.
230.

See id.
See Sokol, supra note 196, at 2071-75.
See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.
See Linda Rogers & William Rogers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19
Bonfield, supra note 128, at 416.
See infra Part V.B.2.a.

2019]

REINVIGORATING CRIMINAL ANTITRUST?

1577

A defendant could raise a void for vagueness claim in such circumstances. That is, when the government charges price-fixing, the
clarity of the prohibition and the long line of cases have permitted
courts to overlook what is a federal common law prohibition in a regime where there is supposedly no federal common law of crime.231
The nature of the rule of reason inquiry does not easily lend itself
to this criminal standard. Going beyond this core prohibition would
raise grave (and probably winning) due process challenges under the
void for vagueness doctrine.232
A. Background on the Void for Vagueness Doctrine
Void for vagueness as a doctrine is itself a rather indeterminate
concept because of the doctrine’s broad language.233 Doctrinally,
John Calvin Jeffries notes, “[t]he inquiry is evaluative rather than
mechanistic; it calls for a judgment concerning not merely the
degree of indeterminacy, but also the acceptability of indeterminacy
in particular contexts.”234 This indeterminacy manifests itself across
Supreme Court cases, particularly with regard to what an ordinary
person might think, as does fair notice.235
The Supreme Court has explained the doctrine in the following
terms:
[T]he terms of a penal statute ... must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part

231. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 47; see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 777, 783
(1965).
232. Bork’s writing on void for vagueness in antitrust suggests that any standard other
than consumer welfare would be vagueness. See BORK , supra note 85, at 82-83. For a modern
explanation of Bork and his antitrust jurisprudence on void for vagueness, see Daniel A.
Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 844 (2013).
233. See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness
Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2015); see also Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or
General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1923) (providing an early analysis of the Supreme
Court’s void for vagueness doctrine).
234. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985).
235. See Low & Johnson, supra note 233, at 2052-53; see also United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Lanzetta v. State of N.J. 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
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will render them liable to its penalties.... And a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act ... so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.236

The classic paper on the vagueness doctrine, by Anthony Amsterdam, explains that the “doctrine was born in the reign of substantive due process and throughout that epoch was successfully urged
exclusively in cases involving regulatory or economic-control legislation.”237 Antitrust falls within the economic-control and regulatory
sphere.238
Peter Low and Joel Johnson make a critical insight into vagueness. They note:
Necessarily, it puts two issues to a federal court. The first is a
construction of the text of the law. The federal court must
determine what the federal law means, and may of course do so
in a manner that avoids the vagueness problem. Or, for one
reason or another, it may feel required to read the federal law in
a manner that brings constitutional vagueness principles into
play.239

Low and Johnson claim that to establish a vagueness claim, first,
there needs to be conduct.240 Conduct is not at question for antitrust
violations under the rule of reason.241 Next, the law needs to have
been predictable.242 The problematic situations are those in which
the behavior in question is based on law that one should have
understood would be included in the prohibition.243 A statute that is
too vague often is standardless. The concern is that a particular
236. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
237. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 74 n.38 (1960).
238. See id.
239. Low & Johnson, supra note 233, at 2059.
240. Id. at 2060.
241. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (“The Sherman Act,
unlike most traditional criminal statutes, does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely
identify the conduct which it proscribes.”).
242. Low & Johnson, supra note 233, at 2053.
243. See id. at 2065.
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statute “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.”244
B. Antitrust and Void for Vagueness
Antitrust potentially may fall into a void for vagueness problem.245 This is not to suggest that all of antitrust is void for vagueness,246 or that all per se criminal antitrust is unconstitutional.247
Rather, there is a case to be made, given that for antitrust restraints are based on a rule of reason approach, that any attempt to
criminalize such behavior again might also lead to a challenge based
on a void for vagueness argument.248
On its face, the Sherman Act appears vague. One can begin with
the words of the Sherman Act itself.249 Section 1 of the Sherman Act
explains that “[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal.”250 Section
2 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
... shall be deemed guilty.”251 However, case law has filled in the

244. Williams, supra note 235. For a recent analysis of vagueness in the white collar crime
context, see David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White Collar Statute, GEORGIA L. REV.
(forthcoming).
245. See Baker, supra note 54, at 694-95 (“By modern standards, the Sherman Act could
well have been too vague to be accepted as constitutional on due process grounds. Over time,
however, the DOJ, and more importantly the courts, gradually developed distinguishing lines
between the kinds of anticompetitive conduct that should be punished criminally and the
remaining conduct, which would only be subject to civil injunctions by the government and
private damage cases by injured victims.”); see also James May, Antitrust Practice and
Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust
Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA . L. REV. 495, 541-52 (1987) (offering an analysis of the early
antitrust state and federal void for vagueness cases).
246. Contra Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2968933 [https://perma.cc/8LR2-Z2ZP] (making such a claim).
247. Charles D. Weller, The End of Criminal Antitrust’s Per Se Conclusive Presumptions,
58 ANTITRUST BULL. 665, 668 (2013).
248. See Sipe, supra note 246 (manuscript at 22-24).
249. See id. (manuscript at 14).
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
251. Id. § 2.
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gaps as to what sort of limits exist for the Sherman Act and similar
state antitrust laws.252
One might argue that if a current court had the inclination, it
could sustain a broad variety of criminal antitrust prosecutions by
citing United States v. Lanier, where the criminal civil rights statute
was upheld regarding sexual assault cases.253 In Lanier, the U.S.
Supreme Court offered guidance as to the “three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement” that are required whether or
not a criminal statute may be unconstitutionally vague.254 These include: (1) the vagueness doctrine, (2) the rule of lenity, and (3) retroactive application of a new construction of the statute.255 The
purpose of the fair warning requirements is to ensure that the “statute, either standing alone or as construed, ma[k]e it reasonably
clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.”256 The vagueness manifestation may be at play in the antitrust
context.
1. The Void for Vagueness Sherman Act Cases
The most important federal antitrust void for vagueness Supreme Court decision is Nash v. United States.257 To understand
Nash, one must first understand its context in terms of Justice
Holmes’s prior dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States.258
Justice Holmes did not believe in competitive effects; he rejected
this approach in both Northern Securities and Nash.259 Justice
Holmes argued, “[t]he act says nothing about competition.”260
Instead, the act was based on prior common law.261

252. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
253. 520 U.S. 259, 261 (1997).
254. Id. at 266.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 267.
257. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
258. 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. See Nash, 229 U.S. at 378; N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 403-05 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
260. N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 404.
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In Northern Securities, Justice Holmes laid out how criminal use
of § 2 of the Sherman Act was to be conceptualized.262 He explained, “that whatever is criminal when done by way of combination
is equally criminal if done by a single man.”263 The Court picked
up this language of the ultimate goal of Sherman Act § 1 and § 2
being the same in other cases, most notably in Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States.264
In Standard Oil, the Court explained the prohibitions in § 2 were
meant simply to complement § 1:
[T]o make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and
perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by
the first section ... even although the acts by which such results
are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not
embraced within the general enumeration of the first section.265

The Court again picked up this language in later cases, such as
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.266 In Klor’s, the Court
explained that the goal of the prohibitions of both § 1 and § 2 of the
Sherman Act “was to adopt the common-law proscription of all
‘contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic
tendency ...’ and which interfered with the ‘natural flow’ of an
appreciable amount of interstate commerce.”267 Thus, what is
criminal in a § 1 setting potentially could be equally applicable in a
§ 2 setting.
Such an understanding is not without critique. There have been
a few cases that have attacked the Sherman Act on vagueness
grounds. Some attacks were based on state antitrust cases and
others were based on federal cases.268 One issue that complicated
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Of note, Standard Oil accepted the results of prior common law
railroad cases even if the reasoning was not explicitly articulated. See id. at 64-68 (discussing
previous railroad cases, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)
and United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)); see also Bork, supra note 231,
at 793-94.
265. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61; see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
181 (1911).
266. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
267. Id. at 211.
268. See May, supra note 245, at 542.
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federal antitrust law for some time were the early rule of reason
cases, Standard Oil269 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.,270
under which it was not clear when the rule of reason would apply
vis-à-vis per se illegality. The first such case to test the limits of
Standard Oil was Nash, where a defendant claimed that the term
“restraint of trade,” in the Sherman Act was not clear.271 The Court,
however, rejected the void for vagueness claim, although the statute
did not effectively lay out the elements that must be proven in a
successful criminal action.272 Since Nash, no party has successfully
brought a void for vagueness federal antitrust case.273 Yet, the limits
of Nash and other cases suggest that certain Sherman Act cases
today might be viewed as vague.274
Supreme Court cases have made certain antitrust doctrines
clearly not void for vagueness. The easiest such case involved pricefixing, which the Supreme Court continues to find per se illegal.275
In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the Court articulated:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective,
is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to
control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and
business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.
Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of
the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price
reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed
and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it
has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express legislation
requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

221 U.S. 1 (1911).
221 U.S. 106.
229 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1913).
See id. at 378.
Cf. Sipe, supra note 246 (manuscript at 28).
See id. (manuscript at 29).
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394, 400-01 (1927).
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the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of
business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether
prices are reasonable—a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies.276

What this decision makes clear is that the nature of inquiry (per
se illegality) matters for a void for vagueness claim, as does the
fact that the economics of the conduct in question clearly suggest
that the practice is anticompetitive.277 Similarly, in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Court stated that when the per se
rule applies, the reasonableness of the activity is irrelevant, noting, “[w]hatever economic justification particular price-fixing
agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness.”278 This approach has been blessed
by the leading antitrust treatise.279 These cases suggest that antitrust is not vague when the conduct being undertaken is clearly
illegal and where this is well understood.280
2. Changing Antitrust Thinking and Its Implications on
Void for Vagueness Arguments
The vague prohibitions in antitrust laws suggest that parties
should raise constitutional questions when enforcement posture is
changing based on economics that may or may not violate antitrust
laws.
a. Rule of Reason
Understanding the rule of reason helps to conceptualize the limits
to criminal rule of reason Sherman Act enforcement that may potentially lead to vagueness concerns. The full rule of reason inquiry
276. Id. at 397-98.
277. See id. at 397-401.
278. 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940).
279. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 7 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1508, at 403 (1986)
(“[P]er se condemnation is appropriate for restraints that are properly classified as ‘naked.’”).
280. Thus, there is notice as required under more recent vagueness cases. See supra note
236 and accompanying text.
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is open ended.281 This has led to some academic criticism of the rule
of reason.282 Nevertheless it has some structure. As the Supreme
Court discussed in Leegin:
The rule of reason is designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market.... As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying
the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish
the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate
anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more
guidance to businesses. Courts can, for example, devise rules
over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to
prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.283

This type of rule of analysis is longstanding, although the specific
contours of the rule of reason have changed over time. The Court
reserves per se liability for those agreements that are “so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality.”284 The economic presumptions about when
a rule is better set as per se versus rule of reason also finds support
in the leading antitrust treatise285 and from the most-cited and
influential antitrust scholar286 of this generation.287
More generally, the push to rule of reason is a function of a
concern that an overinclusive rule would chill procompetitive
281. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1379 (2009).
282. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role
for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 338 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and
the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2005).
283. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007).
284. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
285. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1508, at 474 (4th
ed. 2017).
286. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in the
Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1919,
1920 (2015); Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise,
100 IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2040 (2015).
287. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 137 (2018) (“Per se
illegality is appropriate if judicial experience indicates that a particular class of restraints
rarely has any effect but to reduce output and increase price.”).
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behavior.288 Though antitrust jurisprudence on this issue is modern,
the very first rule of reason case, Standard Oil, articulated this
concern by noting that not all restraints are problematic under the
Sherman Act, only unreasonable restraints.289 Similarly, Justice
Brandeis’s opinion in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,
explained the basis of the rule of reason as follows:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.290

This basis for the rule of reason helped lay the foundation for subsequent rule of reason cases.291
Rule of reason analysis is linked to the void for vagueness doctrine.292 In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., a vagueness case involving
288. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895 (advocating that courts ought not to increase “the total cost
of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies
rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular
contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found
unlawful.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“[W]e
must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of
undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.” (quoting
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983))).
289. Standard Oil of N.J. Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
290. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
291. See Gavil, supra note 115, at 742.
292. See Bork, supra note 231, at 792.
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Colorado’s antitrust law, the Court articulated that the Sherman
Act cannot be considered vague when the restraints in question had
procompetitive effects and were not per se illegal because the anticompetitive effects were outweighed by the procompetitive effects.293
The Court stated:
[T]hat it was recognized in their text that there were incidental
restraints of trade that the statute was not intended to cover....
where the language of the federal statute was read in the light
of the common law, and in accordance with its reason, and was
construed not to penalize such partial restraints of trade as at
common law were not only permitted but were promoted in the
interest of the freedom of trade itself.294

A rule of reason burden-shifting approach in antitrust looks very
different from the approach taken under criminal law with regard
to burdens. As Lawrence Solan explains, “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt has been the government’s burden in criminal cases for
virtually this country’s entire history.”295 By its definition, the rule
of reason is anything but beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the
rule of reason in operation is based on doubt, due to shifting burdens of proof for the plaintiff and defendant.296 The purpose of the
rule of reason is to “distinguish[ ] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints
stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.”297
The rule of reason inquiry under black-letter law is relatively
clear.298 There is a three-step process of burden shifting.299 First, the
plaintiff has the burden to allege and provide that there is sufficient
evidence that the defendant has sufficient market power to undertake an anticompetitive restraint,300 and that the defendant has
293. 274 U.S. 445, 461 (1927).
294. Id. at 461.
295. Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105 (1999).
296. See Hovenkamp, supra note 287, at 101-04.
297. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
298. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 287, at 101-04.
299. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018); PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 15.02[B], at 15-17 (4th ed. Supp.
2018).
300. See Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d

2019]

REINVIGORATING CRIMINAL ANTITRUST?

1587

imposed such a restraint.301 Next, if the plaintiff can meet this burden and establish a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm, the
burden then shifts to the defendant.302 The defendant must show a
procompetitive justification for the restraint.303 If the defendant provides sufficient evidence of a procompetitive justification for the
restraint, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff.304 The plaintiff then
may show that the same restraint could have been achieved through
a less restrictive alternative.305
Given how infrequently the Supreme Court hears antitrust cases,
let alone full-blown rule of reason cases, the lack of developed antitrust case law as to the rule of reason amplifies the potential vagueness of the application of criminal sanctions in cases decided under
the rule of reason.306 This is especially problematic given how antitrust per se conduct has narrowed over time.307
The rule of reason presents potential problems for purposes of
criminal enforcement. Even the dissent in Leegin questions the use
of criminal penalties for rule of reason cases.308 Justice Breyer asked, “[a]re there special advantages to a bright-line rule? Without
1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Calculators Hawaii, Inc., v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332,
1338 (9th Circ. 1983)) (“Proof that defendant’s activities had an impact upon competition in
the relevant market is ‘an absolutely essential element of the rule of reason case.’”).
301. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)
(“Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA’s television plan has a significant potential
for anticompetitive effects.”).
302. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“If the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden
shifts to the defendant.”).
303. Id. (stating that the defendant must “show a procompetitive rationale for the
restraint”); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113 (“Under the Rule of Reason, these hallmarks of
anticompetitive behavior place upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free
market.”).
304. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
305. Id. (“If the defendant makes this showing, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less
anticompetitive means.”). See generally United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir.
1993); C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM . L. REV.
927 (2016).
306. See generally Arthur, supra note 282; Stucke, supra note 281.
307. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW . 435, 436
(2011) (“The Supreme Court has ... continually narrowed the types of conduct subject to per
se condemnation.”).
308. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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such a rule, it is often unfair ... for enforcement officials to bring
criminal proceedings.”309 The concern for overreach of criminal penalties for business behavior that might fall under the rule of reason
has been articulated in other decisions.310 For example, the fear of
criminal conduct for what should not be per se prohibitions, but a
rule of reason animates the Court in non per se Sherman Act conduct cases.311 In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., the Court explained, “[m]anufacturers would be likely to forgo
legitimate and competitively useful conduct rather than risk treble
damages and perhaps even criminal penalties.”312 The Court made
this statement when a dealer who sold calculators brought a claim
regarding termination by the supplier.313 At issue was whether or
not such behavior was a per se violation.314 The Court held that such
a vertical restraint was not per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman
Act except in a situation where the restraint included an agreement
of price or price levels.315 Understanding the quotation in the context
of the broader case, the Court seems to suggest that criminal
sanctions are only possible in a per se world rather than that of the
rule of reason.
b. Court as Regulator
The Court articulated a concern in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co. that criminal convictions should not be within the
Court’s toolkit where courts would serve as regulators.316 The Court
observed:
The criminal sanctions would be used, not to punish conscious
and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions,
but instead simply to regulate business practices regardless of
the intent with which they were undertaken. While in certain
cases we have imputed a regulatory purpose to Congress in
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
See, e.g., id. at 727-28.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 735-36.
See 438 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1978).
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choosing to employ criminal sanctions ... the availability of a
range of nonpenal alternatives to the criminal sanctions of the
Sherman Act negates the imputation of any such purpose to
Congress in the instant context.317

This type of concern regarding criminal penalties for Sherman
Act violations clarifies the purpose and basis of antitrust.318 The
Court further explained, “[s]imply put, the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has been
construed to have a ‘generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.’”319 As a result,
the Court noted that it is not the case that “judicial elaboration of
the Act always yielded the clear and definitive rules of conduct
which the statute omits; instead open-ended and fact-specific standards like the ‘rule of reason’ have been applied to broad classes of
conduct falling within the purview of the Act’s general provisions.”320
These types of conduct lead to potential problems with regard to
criminality. The Court explained, “[w]ith certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal because of its unquestionably anticompetitive effects ... the behavior proscribed by the Act is often
difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and
economically justifiable business conduct.”321
More recent cases also make clear the Court’s deep reluctance to
have antitrust law serve as a price regulator. In Trinko, the Court
articulated a concern that antitrust courts, as an institutional matter, are not well suited “to act as central planners, identifying the
proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.”322 The Court reiterated this institutional concern in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v.
Linkline Communications, Inc.323
The Court has rejected void for vagueness concerns in a number
of areas of law that require rate regulation or concerns of price317. Id. at 442 (internal citation omitted).
318. See id. at 435-36.
319. Id. at 439 (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60
(1993)).
320. Id. at 438.
321. Id. at 440-41 (internal citation omitted).
322. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
323. See 555 U.S. 438, 452-55 (2009).
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related conduct, such as railroads324 or antitrust.325 However, the
types of concerns regarding these earlier cases are different than
the specific vagueness concerns that are raised with regard to a
rule of reason approach. Let us begin with Nash, the first attack on
the Sherman Act on vagueness grounds.326 At issue, in part, was
whether or not criminal sanctions under the Sherman Act for an
agreement to fix bids based on vertical and predatory behavior
were void for vagueness.327 The Court held that the Sherman Act
was not void because a “prudent man” would understand the clarity required to undertake such an agreement.328
3. Intent
Intent plays a role outside of per se cases, which makes it more
difficult to prove. This has mitigated vagueness concerns for the
Sherman Act.329 However, it also sets a very high bar for potential
criminal enforcement of noncollusion based Sherman Act crimes.330
United States v. Gypsum Co. was an information exchange case outside of the traditional per se boundaries.331 The underlying conduct
was defendants that would telephone their competitors in order to
verify prices to avoid liability under Robinson-Patman by establishing a meeting-competition defense.332 The defendants denied that
they had intended to engage in illegal activity.333 The Court addressed this criminal case by applying a rule of reason analysis.334
In Gypsum, the Court held that intent could not be presumed in
rule of reason cases.335 The Supreme Court articulated that intent

324. See R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 336 (1886).
325. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
326. See generally id.
327. See id. at 376-77.
328. Id. at 377.
329. See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 666
(2001).
330. See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis,
54 AM . UNIV. L. REV. 151, 153 (2004).
331. See 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
332. Id. at 429.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 438.
335. Id. at 435-36.
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was a critical part of criminal enforcement.336 A defendant needed
to have “undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences
and hav[e] the requisite anticompetitive effects”337 or alternatively
be “undertaken with the purpose of producing anticompetitive effects ... even if such effects [do] not come to pass.”338
Post-Gypsum, lower courts have held that intent exists when the
government can prove that a defendant has knowledge that he participated in a cartel.339 Thus, under per se criminal § 1 antitrust,
criminal intent is not an element of the criminal violation.340
However, under the rule of reason, it is an inference.341 This inference seems rather significant since the rule of reason normally
requires a more significant analysis.342 Nevertheless, the intent
requirement creates a potential void for vagueness problem as the
shortcut which prevents judges or juries from deciding the reasonableness of the restraint,343 which goes to the issue of effect.
Intent has been read into § 2 of the Sherman Act (although typically to show effect for monopolization cases).344 The same concerns
of intent also play a role in attempted monopolization cases.345 This
336. Id. at 435.
337. Id. at 444.
338. Id. at 444 n.21.
339. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 449 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290,
298 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 461-62 (3d Cir. 1979).
340. See United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1270 (6th Cir. 1995); United States
v. All Star Indus., 962 F.2d 465, 474 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Misle Bus & Equip. Co.,
967 F.2d 1227, 1231, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1992); Brown, 936 F.2d at 1046; United States v. Coop.
Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988).
341. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 435, 446.
342. See supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text (desribing the rule of reason analysis).
343. See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 239
F. Supp. 2d 180, 189 (D.R.I. 2003) (“While motive is a relevant consideration in determining
whether concerted actions violate the Sherman Act, the ultimate question is whether the
challenged conduct unreasonably restrains trade.”); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource,
Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir.1993) (“Motive can ... be a guide to expected effects, but effects
are still the central concern of the antitrust laws, and motive is mainly a clue.”).
344. See Cass & Hylton, supra note 329, at 658-59; Lao, supra note 330, at 154.
345. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW , ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 307 (6th ed. 2007)
(“The same principles used in the monopolization context to distinguish aggressive competition from anticompetitive exclusion thus apply in attempt cases.”); see also Gen. Leaseways,
Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1989) (“We attach rather
little weight to internal company documents used to show anticompetitive intent, because,
though they sometimes dazzle a jury, they case only a dim light on what ought to be the
central question in an antitrust case: actual or probable competitive effect.”).
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reading in of intent is perhaps even more problematic because of
the difficulty of understanding the difference between the intent to
partake in procompetitive versus anticompetitive activity.346 Courts
have considered intent in Supreme Court cases such as Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.347 and Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,348 and important circuit court
cases, such as United States v. Microsoft Corp.349 and LePage’s Inc.
v. 3M.350 However, A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. mentions with disfavor that “[t]raipsing through the warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence both increases
the costs of litigation and reduces the accuracy of decisions,”351 and
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC casts doubt on the use of intent
altogether.352 Nevertheless, intent plays a limited role in § 2 cases.
The same concerns of intent also play a role in attempted monopolization cases.353
Intent is problematic from the standpoint of current cases in part
because it distracts from the economic evidence that an effectsbased antitrust requires.354 However, as a criminal matter, proving
intent would be necessary for a criminal conduct case, and the level
of intent would be a higher level than that required civilly.355 Given
the conceptual difficulty in some courts and in the leading treatise
on intent even in civil noncollusion conduct cases,356 proving intent
346. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1039 (2000).
347. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
348. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
349. 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[O]ur focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not
upon the intent behind it. Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is
relevant only to the extent that it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s
conduct.”).
350. 324 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2003).
351. 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989).
352. 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000).
353. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW , ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 307 (6th ed. 2007)
(“The same principles used in the monopolization context to distinguish aggressive
competition from anticompetitive exclusion thus apply in attempt cases.”); Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1993) (“However, intent alone is insufficient to establish
the dangerous probability of success.”).
354. See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402; Hovenkamp, supra note 346, at 1039 (“[T]he
‘intent’ to create a monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished from the intent to do
so competitively.”).
355. See Lao, supra note 330, at 152 n.1, 201.
356. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 805a, at 339-40,
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criminally, where intent has been read into the statute, may lead to
a void for vagueness problem.357
4. Severity of Punishment and Void for Vagueness
Severity of punishment is an important factor in vagueness considerations.358 Whereas the old antitrust void for vagueness cases
were decided during an era in which an antitrust crimes were misdemeanors, the current antitrust criminal structure has significant
potential jail time.359 Severity of punishment is a factor for the
Court in vagueness analysis.360 In Johnson v. United States, the
Court found a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act that defined a violent felony to be void for vagueness based on language
that a felony “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”361 In Johnson, the penalty
was a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years.362 As a result,
vagueness concerns “appl[ied] not only to statutes defining elements
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”363
The more serious the penalties for a criminal statute, the more
important vagueness concerns become.364 Thus, there is legitimate
concern that high prison sentences for monopolization or noncartel conduct would be unproportional. Price fixing typically averages
three years in prison per conviction.365 However, unlike areas of
clear wrongdoing such as collusion, sentences that would be as long
¶ 805b2, at 342 (2d ed. 2002).
357. See BORK, supra note 85, at 57 (“The bare language of the Sherman Act conveys little.”); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO .
L.J. 1623, 1623 (2005) (“Over its 114-year history, Section Two of the Sherman Act has been
a source of puzzlement to lawyers, judges and scholars, a puzzlement derived in large part
from the statute’s extraordinary brevity.” (footnote omitted)).
358. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1142 (2016).
359. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706,
1708 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012)).
360. See Hessick, supra note 358, at 1142.
361. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2257 (2015).
362. Id. at 2555.
363. Id. at 2557.
364. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.”).
365. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel
Enforcement at 8 (Apr. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3162867 [https://perma.cc/2C5W-KN26].
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(if not longer) for noncollusive criminal conduct begin to look potentially excessive. This could be in violation of the Eighth Amendment.366
The concern about proportionality has been articulated in the
antitrust context for over one hundred years.367 Certainly, the concern of proportionality would be at issue with regard to Sherman
Act rule of reason cases where the statutory maximum is significant, with increasing criminal penalties for individuals and corporations.368
Without a clear and objective standard for what criminal enforcement would look like for noncollusion cases under the Sherman Act,
antitrust may have a void for vagueness problem. Such a result
would also threaten the clarity that has emerged after a shift in
case law and agency practice, which has provided guidance as to the
difference between criminal and civil enforcement by the Antitrust
Division for certain forms of conduct.369 The increase in criminal
fines for what is clearly per se illegal antitrust conduct in terms of
collusion is inappropriate in cases where there is a procompetitive
rationale for the behavior under the rule of reason.370
5. Void for Vagueness for Robinson-Patman Criminal
Violations
Antitrust vagueness has been attacked not merely in the Sherman Act but also in the Robinson-Patman Act. In United States v.
366. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L.
REV. 677, 727-30 (2005).
367. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (“[T]he law is full of instances
where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly ... some matter of degree. If his
judgment is wrong ... he may incur the penalty of death.”).
368. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 365, manuscript at 3, 7. This concern is not unique to the
United States. See generally Florian Wagner-von Papp, Compliance and Individual Sanctions
in the Enforcement of Competition Law, in COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES 135
(Johannes Paha ed., 2016). In Ireland, hard core offenses were moved to be decriminalized
because of nonuse of these penalties but “its Attorney General advised that substantial civil
fines could raise constitutional concerns under Article 38 of the Irish Constitution.” See id.
at 165 n.50.
369. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 305 (2005) (detailing the
doctrinal shift).
370. See Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the
Future, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 961 (1987).
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National Dairy Products Corp., the Supreme Court held that pricing
below cost was not void for vagueness under the Robinson-Patman
Act.371 This case and holding are technically still good case law.372
However, the Court has also made it clear that due to the Sherman
Act’s lack of detail and specificity, the Act more generally has not
been interpreted “as if it were primarily a criminal statute.”373 This
lack of specificity is a concern based on vagueness.
However, a number of things set the Robinson-Patman Act apart
for void for vagueness arguments made under the Sherman Act.
First, the Robinson-Patman Act is not decided under the rule of
reason.374 Rather, a Section 2(a) claim under the Act requires, “(1) A
difference in price, (2) in reasonably contemporaneous sales of two
buyers purchasing from a single seller, (3) involving commodities,
(4) of like grade and quality (5) that may injure competition.”375
Even if the elements of a violation are made, there are affirmative
defenses, such as under Section 2(b) of the Act.
Second, the rationale in National Dairy was due to conduct that
involved below-cost pricing.376 By today’s standard for below-cost
pricing, the conduct would not only not be criminal, it would also not
be a violation of the Act, which the Court now treats akin to the
Sherman Act in terms of economic analysis for predatory pricing
under § 2, and requires recoupment.377 By focusing on per se conduct, not only is there a notice with regard to desuetude, as discussed earlier, but also with regard to vagueness because of the
notice problem.
The Court also made a distinction in National Dairy that seems
less appropriate today. It articulated that First Amendment vague371. 372 U.S. 29, 37 (1963).
372. See id. at 33.
373. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978).
374. See Sokol, supra note 196, at 2080-81, 2096-97.
375. Steven J. Cernak, ANTITRUST IN DISTRBUTION AND FRANCHISING 88 (2015).
376. 372 U.S. at 29, 36.
377. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221-22, 224
(1993). Technically, Brook Group addressed only primary-line competitive injury. Id. at 22021. However, the Court provides dicta explaining that the purpose of Robinson-Patman is no
different from that of the other antitrust statutes. Id. at 220. In practice, this means that
Robinson-Patman is guided by economic analysis in which the competitive effects play a role.
Id. (“Thus, ‘the Robinson-Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader policies
of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13
(1979))).
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ness cases are different from those cases that purely address economic issues and that the concern of the latter is less important.378
However, the Court has found statutes void for vagueness in other
types of economic crimes, most notably in Skilling v. United States
(involving misrepresentation of the financial performance of Enron).379 The Court was concerned about whether the scope of the
setting standards of disclosure for corporate executives was appropriate as a delegation between the courts and the DOJ in light
of the of the institutional complexity and heavy potential jail time
for individuals.380 The open-ended nature of mail fraud created the
possibility of “a wider range of offensive conduct ... [that] would
raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”381 This type of concern, if applied to Robinson-Patman, may
suggest a case for void for vagueness in the criminal context.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined how the common law doctrine of desuetude would prevent punishment that is unduly harsh, such as
criminalization, because such punishment has fallen out of use.382
This can be applied to antitrust for both Sherman Act and RobinsonPatman Act claims. Further, this Article has addressed how criminalization for antitrust violations that have moved from per se
illegality to rule of reason creates a potential void for vagueness
problem due to a lack of notice and disproportionate enforcement.383
This is because antitrust criminal liability (including incarceration)
for pricing-related practices that are rule of reason based have a
lower standard (akin to preponderance of the evidence) than do traditional felonies that require a standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.384 Thus, while criminal antitrust for noncollusion crimes
technically remains good law, it may be unconstitutional.

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Nat’l Dairy, 372 U.S. at 36-37.
561 U.S. 358, 368-69, 404 (2010).
See Low & Johnson, supra note 233, at 2089.
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.2.a.

2019]

REINVIGORATING CRIMINAL ANTITRUST?

1597

As a matter of antitrust policy, antitrust is better functioning now
as to both procedure and substance than it was during its nadir of
the 1950s and 1960s.385 This is not to say that the current institutional structure and case outcomes of antitrust are perfect—far
from it. Rather, antitrust has a workable institutional structure, a
singular goal that allows for a more even application of law as to
both process and substance.386 Criminal enforcement for a generation has been limited to those cases that involve “naked” collusion—the so called “hard-core” cartels where there is direct evidence
of illegal activity.387 Violators of Sherman § 1 for collusion regularly
go to jail, as they should.388 However, the changing institutional
structure of antitrust towards a more populist approach suffers from
a “nirvana fallacy” under which feasible policies, as compared to
ideal normative policies, are viewed as inherently inefficient because of their various imperfections.389
Antitrust has pushed back from criminal penalties for other types
of conduct that are part of daily business behavior and that might
chill procompetitive business behavior.390 Where there are concerns
of exclusion or predation, often these cases are ones in which the
balance between anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications are complex and require a rule of reason analysis.391 To
criminalize behavior that has the potential to be efficient under a
rule of reason analysis returns antitrust to an era of business inhospitability. Such an enforcement regime would chill business risk
taking, precisely the sort of risk taking that the Supreme Court has
stated to be the very purpose of competition which antitrust is to
protect.392 Worse, after more than a generation of nonenforcement, such enforcement would violate the doctrine of desuetude
385. See supra Part III.
386. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 191.
388. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 365, manuscript at 7, 11.
389. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON . 1, 1-4 (1969).
390. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007).
391. See supra Part V.B.2.a.
392. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.”).
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and present a void for vagueness problem. As such, a return to a
more populist antitrust that would recriminalize many forms of
business conduct not only presents constitutional problems, but also
retards innovation and chills business decision making that may in
fact serve to enhance consumer welfare.393 The potential for jail for
practices that have procompetitive behavior would damper such
practices, which in turn would hurt consumers. Enhancing consumer welfare is exactly what the antitrust laws are supposed to
do.394

393. See FED. TRADE COMM ’N , TO PROMOTE INNOVATION : THE PROPER BALANCE OF COM PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/
innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G76-P63A] (“Innovation benefits consumers through the
development of new and improved goods, services, and processes. An economy’s capacity for
invention and innovation helps drive its economic growth and the degree to which standards
of living increase. Technological breakthroughs such as automobiles, airplanes, the personal
computer, the Internet, television, telephones, and modern pharmaceuticals illustrate the
power of innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of our lives.” (footnote
omitted)).
394. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 114b, at 151-53 (4th
ed. 2013).
PETITION AND

